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Abstract
Blindsight patients, whose primary visual cortex is lesioned, exhibit preserved ability to discriminate visual stimuli presented
in their ‘‘blind’’ field, yet report no visual awareness hereof. Blindsight is generally studied in experimental investigations of
single patients, as very few patients have been given this ‘‘diagnosis’’. In our single case study of patient GR, we ask whether
blindsight is best described as unconscious vision, or rather as conscious, yet severely degraded vision. In experiment 1 and
2, we successfully replicate the typical findings of previous studies on blindsight. The third experiment, however, suggests
that GR’s ability to discriminate amongst visual stimuli does not reflect unconscious vision, but rather degraded, yet
conscious vision. As our finding results from using a method for obtaining subjective reports that has not previously used in
blindsight studies (but validated in studies of healthy subjects and other patients with brain injury), our results call for a
reconsideration of blindsight, and, arguably also of many previous studies of unconscious perception in healthy subjects.
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Introduction
Blindsight patients, whose primary visual cortex is severely
lesioned, exhibit preserved ability to discriminate visual stimuli
presented in their blind field, yet report no visual awareness [1].
This finding has been widely interpreted as indicating that vision
can occur unconsciously [2], and, for this reason, it is considered
one of the most interesting sources of data in the study of human
consciousness. A few studies, contrary to the standard interpreta-
tion of blindsight, have instead suggested a correlation between
discrimination ability and conscious awareness, just as in healthy
participants. Thus, both Zeki & Ffytche [3] and Stoerig & Barth
[4] have reported findings of ‘‘weak visual experiences’’ in
blindsight. Larry Weiskrantz and colleagues found that blindsight
patient DB described experiencing ‘‘feelings’’ when presented with
visual stimuli in his blind field [5]. Weiskrantz suggested that such
blindsight patients should be distinguished from those who fail to
report any conscious experience whatsoever (‘‘Type 2’’ vs ‘‘Type
1’’ patients).
Here, we ask whether blindsight is best described as unconscious
vision, or rather as conscious, yet severely degraded vision.
Addressing this question requires using a sufficiently sensitive
method to collect subjective reports. Most previous studies have
used a binary report methodology (‘‘Did you see the stimulus or
not?’’) [6], sometimes augmented by further probing about the
patient’s confidence in his report [7,8]. In all such cases however,
asking participants to express a binary judgment about their
perceptual experiences may fail to detect weak conscious
knowledge, and hence underestimate the extent to which
participants are aware of such knowledge. Lau and Passingham
[9] have recently presented the similar suggestion that blindsight
patients may have conscious vision, but set their threshold for
reporting awareness too high.
The patient involved in the experiment below is a 31-year old
woman (GR) who had been experiencing fluctuating attacks of
headaches during a period of 2–3 months. She suddenly developed
strong headache, blindness in the right part of her visual field, and
she dropped to a Glasgow Coma Score (GCS) level of 12. Cerebral
CT scanning showed a hemorrhage in the left occipital lobe
(anterior part), surrounding subarachnoid space, and into the left
lateral ventricle. There was a moderate hydrocephalus.
The following day, GCS decreased to 7, and a new CT
scanning showed increased hydrocephalus. A drain was placed in
the right lateral ventricle to drain CSF. Angiography showed an
arteriovenous malformation. The malformation was treated with
endovascular embolization. After surgery, she gradually woke up,
but was disoriented and showed decreased short term memory and
right sided hemianopia.
A control CT scanning 1.5 weeks later showed that the bleeding
was resorbed, revealing loss of tissue in the left occipital cortex.
GR left intensive care and started rehabilitation at Hammel
Neurorehabilitation and Research Center. Here, she slowly
recovered from all physical and cognitive dysfunction, except the
right sided hemianopia. An opthamological examination conclud-
ed that she had no dysfunction or injuries to the eyes, and it was
concluded she was ‘‘cortically blind’’ in the upper right quadrant.
The experiments were conducted after GR had been in
rehabilitation for about 3 weeks, and her neuropsychological
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the study, her condition was not changed from at the time of the
experiments.
Results and Discussion
To obtain more exact subjective reports, we developed a novel
method to assess awareness in healthy participants, — the
Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) [10]. To develop PAS, we
asked how healthy participants spontaneously scale the clarity of
their perceptual experiences when presented with visual figures
(triangles, circles and squares) displayed for a random duration
ranging between 16 and 192 ms. All subjects intuitively chose a
multiple point scale and found it to represent their visual
experience better. Interestingly, the subjects generally agreed on
the following labelling of four scale points: (CI) ‘‘clear image’’,
(ACI) ‘‘almost clear image’’ (meaning ‘‘I think I know what was
shown’’), (WG) ‘‘weak glimpse’’ (meaning ‘‘something was there
but I had no idea what it was’’), and (NS) ‘‘not seen’’ [10]. In
subsequent experiments [11], the PAS scale has been adapted to
be used by other participants, who again interacted with the
experimenter about the meaning of the scale points. All
participants in these further studies found the scale to accurately
reflect their visual experiences. Strong correlations to accuracy and
reaction time were also found for each participant: The more
clearly the subjects reported to see the stimulus, the faster they
responded what it was and their answer tended to be correct.
Here, for the first time, PAS is applied to assess awareness in a
blindsight patient, GR, who reports no visual experience in the
upper right quadrant of her visual field after damage to the left
part of her visual cortex. The scale shares basic similarities with a
scale created by Zeki and Ffytche
4 in a study of GY, a patient who
was hemianopic after a lesion to V1. GY claimed to have vague
feelings of stimuli presented to his blind field. Zeki and Ffytche
suggested that lesions to V1 may lead to an uncoupling of visual
discrimination and awareness. Presenting GY to moving stimuli,
authors demonstrate that activity in V5 is more intense in
gnosanopsia (awareness without discrimination) than in agnosopsia
(discrimination without awareness). The scale captured the essence
of GY’s ‘‘residual awareness’’ in his blind field, which he described
as ‘‘a feeling of something happening’’, although the scale points
were not based on empirical grounds in the same way as PAS.
Essential to the finding is that these kinds of experience cannot fit
into a dichotomic division between clearly conscious and
unconscious perception.
In a first experiment aimed at documenting the extent of GR’s
deficit, the patient was asked to indicate whether she had
perceived a letter presented on a computer screen. As expected
from GR’s clinical examination, she missed all presentations in the
upper right quadrant (figure 1). At the periphery of the blind area,
there are two stimulus locations with one instead of zero hits out of
three presentations. This can be interpreted as resulting either
from saccadic eye movements, or as indicating a ‘‘border area’’
where vision is partially intact. As her task was simply to report
detection ‘‘of something’’, her lack of responsiveness in the upper
right quadrant clearly indicated no normally functioning conscious
vision in the area.
In a second experiment, we aimed at exploring the relationship
between GR’s discrimination performance and her visual
awareness, using standard ‘‘objective’’ methods for assessing
Figure 1. Experiment 1 reveals the size and location of GR’s blind field. This figure illustrates how the screen was divided into areas, where
stimuli were presented. For each numbered area, 3 stimuli were presented in random order during the experiment. The colour code illustrates how
many times she responded to stimuli flashed in the relevant part of the screen
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003028.g001
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presented to her, and (2) to report whether she saw something or
not, using binary report.
The results from experiment 1 were used to select the results
that were to be compared in the following two experiments. On
this basis, 11 locations with 0 or 1 response were selected. The
stimuli presented in the upper right quadrant (33 during
experiment 2, and the same amount for experiment 3) were
compared to the stimuli presented in the upper left quadrant (a
directly comparable ‘‘healthy part’’ of her visual field with the
same amount of stimuli). As shown in Table 1a, there are, as
expected, many more stimuli reported to be ‘‘unseen’’ rather than
‘‘seen’’ in the damaged part of GR’s visual field (26 ‘‘unseen’’ items
vs 7 ‘‘seen’’). Amongst the 7 stimuli reported ‘‘seen’’, 6 were
correctly identified. Of the 26 stimuli that were reported ‘‘unseen’’,
12 were nevertheless correctly identified. There is thus no
relationship between accuracy and awareness (p=0.15 using
Pearson’s Chi-squared test with Yates’ continuity correction,
p=0.1 using Fisher’s Exact Test for count data) for the injured
visual area under these conditions. This result contrasts with those
obtained for the intact upper left quadrant of the visual field: 27
stimuli were reported to be ‘‘seen’’, vs. 6 reported to be ‘‘unseen’’.
All 27 seen stimuli were correctly identified. Of the 6 stimuli that
were reported ‘‘unseen’’, 2 were correctly identified. There is thus
a significant relationship here between accuracy and awareness
(p=0.0001, using Pearson’s Chi-square with Yates’ continuity
correction, p=0.0003 using Fisher’s Exact Test for count data):
For the intact left quadrant of GR’s visual field — but not for the
damaged right quadrant — reports of perceptual consciousness
are predictive of visual function, as is the case in healthy subjects
13.
There was no significant effect of stimulus duration. According to
the definition of blindsight, — ‘‘visual capacity in a field defect in
the absence of acknowledged awareness’’
1, GR exhibits blindsight
in the damaged part of her visual field.
The third experiment was identical to the second, with the
crucial difference that reports of awareness were now collected
using PAS instead of binary report. Following PAS methodology,
GR went through many trial sessions and discussed with the
experimenters how to best characterize her experiences. She
indicated that the PAS scale points accurately reflected her
experiences in the framework of this experiment, and that PAS
offered a better, more precise match to her perceptions than
binary report.
As shown in table 1b, GR never reported ‘‘not seeing anything’’
in the healthy part of her visual field. These results confirm the
expected strong relationship between experiential clarity and
accuracy as illustrated in figure 2. Strikingly however, and in
contrast to the results obtained using binary report, we observed
the same positive relationship between experiential clarity and
accuracy for items presented in the patient’s blind field. A chi
2 test
showed 14.2, p,0.001 for the intact visual field and 15.1,
p,0.002 for the ‘‘blind’’ field.
This in turn suggests (1) that awareness, when properly assessed,
is predictive of accuracy in the case of blindsight, and (2) that PAS
is a more sensitive measure of conscious awareness than
dichotomous reports.
To further illustrate the relationship between PAS and binary
report, we split the PAS data in different ways. We note that the
pattern of correct and incorrect reports obtained by pitting PAS
‘‘clear image’’ reports against the other three categories is almost
identical to that obtained when GR was asked to gave binary
reports. This suggests that GR is setting her threshold for reporting
awareness too high under binary report conditions. If, instead, the
cut-off for awareness is placed between scale points ‘‘almost clear
image’’ and ‘‘weak glimpse’’ (Table 1c) we would conclude that
GR has a high degree of awareness of stimuli presented in the
injured part of her visual field, since there is a correlation between
awareness and accuracy (p=0.0004, Fisher’s exact test). An
illustration of turning the PAS reports into a binary measure is also
shown in figure 3.
To conclude, with GR, we have demonstrated blindsight using
a visual discrimination task and a standard measure of visual
awareness (Experiment 2). As such, the experiment replicates the
findings of numerous previous studies. Experiment 3, however,
suggests that GR’s ability to discriminate amongst visual stimuli
Table 1. a–c: The number of correct and incorrect reports
using dichotomous reports (1a) or using PAS (1b).
Intact field Injured field
Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect
Seen 27 0 6 1
Not seen 2 4 12 14
Intact field Injured field
Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect
CI 21 0 7 0
A C I 81 83
W G 12 39
N S 00 03
Intact field Injured field
Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect
CI-ACI 29 1 15 3
WG-NS 1 2 3 12
The difference is illustrated in a ‘‘dichotomizing’’ of PAS (1c).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003028.t001
Figure 2. A regression analysis illustrates the relationship
between correctness and PAS. The analysis reveals that the
relationship between accuracy and awareness as assessed by PAS is
the same in the intact and in the blind fields.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003028.g002
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conscious vision. Because this result critically depends on using a
sensitive method to assess awareness, our study therefore calls for a
reconsideration of the methodologies and results obtained in
previous studies not only of blindsight, but also of normal vision.
Materials and Methods
In experiment 1, on each trial, GR was first asked to fixate a
white central cross appearing on a black background. One of three
letters (chosen randomly among A, B, or C) was then presented at
one of 50 equidistant locations spanning the entire visual field, for
a duration of 60 ms, 500 ms, or 1000 ms. All stimuli were
1.4*1.4 cm on the screen. Each location corresponded to one of
the fields in figure 1. Stimuli were presented with the different
durations randomly. The patient then had 3000 ms to indicate
having seen the stimulus by pressing a key on a computer
keyboard. The next trial was initiated immediately thereafter, but
to avoid temporal predictability of the next stimulus, the fixation
cross remained on screen for a random duration ranging from 3 to
6 sec (in increments of 1 sec). The entire experiment involved
three blocks of 50 trials separated from each other by 10 min
breaks, for a total of 150 trials (50 locations63 durations). Out of
these 50 locations, 11 were selected for more detailed statistical
analysis based on the results from experiment 1, as described
above. Locations and durations were fully randomized.
In experiment 2 and 3, GR performed a 3-choice discrimination
task presented with one of three possible white geometrical figures
which were displayed in random order: a triangle, a circle or a
square. The change from letters to geometrical figures as stimuli,
we believed, would help the patient remember that these tasks
differed from the first. As for Experiment 1, each trial was initiated
by the appearance of a white fixation cross displayed on a black
background for a random duration ranging between 3 and 6 sec.
This was followed by the stimulus, randomly presented for 60,
500, or 1000 ms. Following every stimulus presentation, a mask
was presented for 1000 ms. Stimuli were presented once per
duration at every stimulus location (identical to experiment 1), i.e.
a total of 150 trials. After every 50 trials, there was a break for
10 minutes.
After the mask, in experiment 2, GR was presented with a still
screen picture asking her to report whether she had consciously
seen the stimulus or not, pressing one of two buttons. Upon her
report, another still screen picture was presented, asking her to
identify which of the three stimuli that was presented, pressing one
of three buttons. In experiment 3, the first still screen picture was
identical to the one in experiment 2. The second still picture
showed the PAS categories together with the four buttons used.
The experiments were approved by the local ethical committee,
The Central Denmark Region Committee on Biomedical
Research Ethics. GR’s written and verbal consent were obtained
prior to the experiments. The patient’s written and verbal consent
were obtained prior to the experiments. The patient has given
written informed consent to the publication of this article.
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a ‘‘seen’’ vs. ‘‘unseen’’ report (Dichotomous Report) or given a
‘‘Clear Experience/Almost Clear Experience’’ vs. a ‘‘Weak
Glimpse/Not seen’’ report (PAS report), plotted separately for
the Intact and Blind fields".
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